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FINANCING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN CALIFORNIA
A Conference of Legislators, County Supervisors and Bar Leaders*
State Capitol Building
Sacramento, California
January 23, 1985
In 1984, approximately $175 million was spent for the de-
fense of indigents in legal proceedings in California. Despite this
expenditure by state, county and private agencies, disputes over
the source and level of funding have presented the California
Courts with grave constitutional issues: Can a County Auditor
be jailed for refusal to pay court-ordered fees for the defense of
one accused of murder? Can lawyers be compelled to accept un-
compensated appointments to represent indigent prisoners in civil
litigation? Can a county assign the legal defense of indigents to
"low-bid" private contractors on a "piece-rate" basis? Ulti-
mately, these cases present issues which must be addressed by
well informed Legislators and County Supervisors. The Confer-
ence on Financing the Right to Counsel in California brought
these officials together with leaders of the organized bar to learn
the legal and practical dimensions of the problem, compare the
experience of other states and discuss alternative solutions.
The Board of Editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review asked each of the Conference speakers to review the Con-
ference transcript and annotate their comments as appropriate.
We are pleased to reprint the transcript of the Conference on
Financing the Right to Counsel in California in its entirety.
Conference Sponsors
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
American Bar Association
The State Bar of California
Los Angeles County Bar Association
Bar Association of San Francisco
Sacramento County Bar Association
* Reprints of the annotated conference transcript printed in this issue, including the
preceding article by Gerald F. Uelmen, are available at a cost of $1.50 from the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review, 1441 West Olympic Boulevard, California 90015.
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INTRODUCTION AND WELCOME
Gerald F. Uelmen, Conference Director*
On behalf of the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, the
American Bar Association, California Bar Association and the Bar As-
sociations of Los Angeles County, San Francisco and Sacramento
County, I would like to welcome you to the Conference on Financing the
Right to Counsel in California.
Of course, we are here to discuss a very profound issue; not just an
issue of interest to scholars and lawyers and judges, but an issue which
wars have been fought over and people have died for. That issue, of
course, is money.
We are hoping to learn in today's conference what we are getting for
the amount we are paying for the right to counsel in California. In an-
nouncing the conference, we informed you that last year we spent $175
million. That is not all of it.
Certainly the donated services were a substantial part of what we are
spending in California. We are going to learn whether we are getting
enough to meet the standard we want to set for ourselves, how we can
maximize the return on your investment and whether we need to spend
more.
My name is Jerry Uelmen. I am the Conference Director. And at
this time I would like to call on Burke Critchfield, who is the President of
the State Bar of California, to say a few words as well.
Burke M. Critchfield**
Thank you, Jerry. And good morning to all of you. I am delighted
to welcome you to today's Conference on Financing the Right to Counsel
in California. This is an issue that clearly demands our vigorous atten-
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California. Former Assistant
United States Attorney for the Central District of California and past President of California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Professor Uelmen is currently a trustee of the Los Angeles
County Bar Association. Professor Uelmen served as amicus counsel in Yarbrough v. Superior
Court, and his Article on the Yarbrough decision is printed in this issue. See Uelmen, Simmer-
ing on the "Backburner": The Challenge of Yarbrough, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 285 (1985).
** President, State Bar of California (1984-85). Prior to his election to the Board of
Governors of the State Bar, Mr. Critchfield was a member of the State Bar Conference of
Delegates for fourteen years. He has served as President of the Alameda County Bar
Association, the Livermore-Alameda Valley Bar Association, the Alameda County Law
Library Board of Trustees and the Livermore Chamber of Commerce.
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tion. Unless we act, individual lawyers may continue to be asked to re-
solve a question of who pays on an ad hoe case-by-case basis.
Lawyers should not be put in this position, and neither should the
indigent defendant who has a constitutional guarantee to competent legal
services.
I have spoken out on numerous occasions on the inappropriateness,
in my view, of requiring individual attorneys to assume financial respon-
sibility for providing capable defense to indigent defendants in civil cases.
The State Bar has made it one of its legislative priorities to remedy
the Yarbrough decision. It is simply inconsistent to suggest that indigent
defendants are entitled to legal representation in certain civil matters, but
fail to provide the funding necessary to insure that representation is
adequate.
I believe it is unfair to ask the legal profession to shoulder the bur-
den alone. I am equally concerned about the apparent trend towards
underfinancing criminal defense services for indigent defendants.
If the State Bar sits back and permits the erosion of the accused's
constitutional right to counsel, we will have serious damage done to our
system of justice.
Today's conference brings together judges, bar leaders, practitioners
and scholars to discuss the constitutional imperatives, the California re-
sponse and national perspectives and ideas for the challenge ahead. This
meeting is timely and of critical importance. I am honored to be here
and I look forward to the day's discussion.
Thank you all for coming.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPERATIVES IN CRIMINAL CASES
Honorable John K Van de Kamp*
I am here this morning as a prosecutor with two principal interests
in the subject matter at hand. First, given the serious consequences-jail
or prison-as well as serious collateral consequences, a defendant de-
serves to have decent counsel who can devote the time, energy, experi-
ence and requisite skill to his client's cause. It is only fair. The
Constitution demands it. Second, from the standpoint of the prosecutor,
it is generally preferable to have quality opposition than to have a bum-
bler. Quality opposition means that we can worry about our case-and
not so much about whether all the issues have been raised by the defense.
I have been asked this morning to talk about the question of compe-
tency of counsel. It is an ephemeral subject given the rather murky tests
provided to date by our courts. But it ties in with this conference's
theme.
No longer can you assign a lawyer-any lawyer-to a defendant's
cause and figure that you have carried out the constitutional require-
ments. Today our standards provide for competent counsel, whatever
that means. And we are going to have to make the effort to meet those
standards and whatever new standards are developed in the months and
years ahead.
There are policy implications from that, that tie into the conference
today. Public defender offices, as well as private defense counsel, will
have to monitor caseloads and workload and develop scheduling and re-
porting techniques to make sure adequate time can be spent on prepara-
tion. And when there's too much, they are going to have to turn cases
away. Care will have to be taken by courts in appointing lawyers. Expe-
rience will have to be measured against the subject matter at hand, and
the particular needs of each case. Because, rest assured there will be
someone looking over the lawyer's shoulder somewhere down the line,
whether it be juries or judges.
* Attorney General, State of California. As California's Attorney General, Mr. Van de
Kamp is responsible for the work of more than 500 staff attorneys who provide advice and
representation to state agencies and representation on behalf of the state in nearly all criminal
and United States appellate courts. A 23-year veteran of the criminal justice system, Mr. Van
de Kamp served as the Los Angeles County District Attorney, the first Federal Public De-
fender for Los Angeles, Deputy Director and Director of the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys, and United States Attorney in Los Angeles.
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The right to competent counsel is developing flesh and bones right
now. We read about it every couple of days, whether it is in the advance
sheets or in the newspaper. But it is not without growing pains; growing
pains that I know affect some of you who have been trial counsel, who
find your name being bandied about in the appellate courts as incompe-
tent or who may be referred at some point to the State Bar, rightfully or
wrongfully. And indeed, it is not without growing pains as it pertains to
the Attorney General's office because we have to deal with these issues
on appeal.
There is an old maxim that is familiar to many of us as trial lawyers.
It is also, I think, relevant to the evolution of the criminal appeal. If the
defendant loses the case, it goes to the appellate court. He first puts the
trial court judge on trial, challenging the substance and wisdom of the
court's rulings. If that does not work out, as the old adage goes, he puts
the prosecutor on trial, blaming prosecutorial misconduct. And if all
that fails, he puts his own counsel on trial, by claiming he was subject to
incompetency.
The problem is that right now, it seems that the very first claim
made by many criminal defendants is that they did not get competent
counsel. We see it with increasing frequency.
Trial strategists are on trial. Second-guessing becomes the norm.
After all, unless you allege incompetence, appellate defense counsel may
be charged with incompetence. Something of a vicious circle has devel-
oped. And we see these challenges not only on direct appeal, but in
habeas corpus proceedings down the line as well.
This litigation leads to some irony. The trial occurs, ostensibly, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, while the later proceed-
ings often times focus on the competence or incompetence of the trial
counsel.
Prosecutors find themselves in the anomalous position of praising
strategies employed by defense attorneys because other defense counsel
handling that appeal are assailing the same particular tactics. What
prosecutors should pray for today are adequately trained and adequately
funded defenders, as well as standards of competency that are clear and
unmistakable.
I. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
The concept of "effective" assistance of counsel, going back to Pow-
ell v. Alabama' in 1932-which established the fundamental right to ap-
1. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
pointed counsel as a critical part of the right to a fair hearing-had little
significance for counsel in criminal cases and their clients until recent
decisions of the California and United States Supreme Courts.
In the landmark case, People v. Pope,2 our California Supreme Court
set out a two-step test for determining the adequacy of counsel: A crimi-
nal defendant "must show that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to
be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advo-
cates. In addition [the defendant] must establish that counsel's acts or
omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious
defense."
3
In Pope the trial lawyer had failed to present evidence of, or even
raise the issue of, the defendant's borderline mental state. The defendant
had, in fact, suffered from mental retardation, and evidence presented
along those lines might have helped in dealing with some of the incrimi-
nating statements that the defendant had made to law enforcement.
Counsel, however, tried to put on an aggressive "my client didn't do it"
defense.4
Nonetheless the court, after establishing the two-prong test, ruled
against the defendant's claim of attorney incompetency. While sug-
gesting the case was "hastily prepared under intense time pressure," the
court observed that while the "defense preparation was less than exem-
plary," under the facts on the record, there was not a failure of counsel to
the degree that could be characterized as incompetence.5 But at least
California had a new test.
More recently, in People v. Fosselman,6 this test was broadened fur-
ther. A defendant may prove ineffectiveness based on acts or omissions
not amounting to withdrawal of a defense "if he establishes that his
counsel failed to perform with reasonable competence and that it is rea-
sonably probable a determination more favorable to the defendant would
have resulted in the absence ofcounsel'sfailings."7 So we are dealing with
words, typical lawyer's words. The words "reasonably" and "probable"
are words which inevitably require determination on a case-by-case basis.
Fosselman was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, false im-
prisonment and battery on a young woman. The prosecutor ended up
characterizing the defendant as an "animal... out to get somebody that
2. 23 Cal. 3d 412, 590 P.2d 859, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1979).
3. Id. at 425, 590 P.2d at 866, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 739 (emphasis added).
4. Id. at 418-20, 590 P.2d at 861-63, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 734-36.
5. Id. at 429, 590 P.2d at 869, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
6. 33 Cal. 3d 572, 659 P.2d 1144, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1983).
7. Id. at 584, 659 P.2d at 1151, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (emphasis added).
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morning" and made reference to prior alleged criminal acts of the de-
fendant in a manner that the court held to constitute misconduct.' The
defense counsel had not raised any objection at all to those particular
characterizations.
Using the test laid out in Pope, the court held that the record in the
case did not entitle the defendant to a reversal based on denial of effective
counsel. However the court did find that the trial court's refusal to con-
sider a motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective counsel was
erroneous, explaining that it was the trial judge's responsibility to see
"'that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the
accused.' "' The practical result is that the old "farce or sham" test-
articulated as the yardstick for so many years as the litmus test for com-
petent counsel-has gone out of style along with pet rocks and hoola
hoops.
May 14, 1984 was a big day in the United States Supreme Court.
They decided United States v. Cronict ° and Strickland v. Washington.II
Strickland is the premier United States Supreme Court decision in the
area of the right to competent counsel because it was the first time the
Court addressed a claim of counsel's actual ineffectiveness. The Court
held that a defendant must show that, considering all the circumstances,
his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness and so prejudiced him as to result in denial of a fair trial. 2
The Court defined "reasonable probability" as "a probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' 3 Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, commented that
[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must
be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper func-
tioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result. 14
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable,
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal pro-
ceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment."
8. Id at 580-81, 659 P.2d at 1148-49, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
9. Id. at 582-83, 659 P.2d at 1150, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (quoting Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)).
10. 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984).
11. 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
12. Id. at 2064-65.
13. Id. at 2068.
14. Id. at 2064.
15. Id at 2067.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudi-
cial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance. Justice
O'Connor further stated that "the appropriate test for prejudice finds its
roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed
to the defense by the prosecution . . and in the test for materiality of
testimony made unavailable to the defense by government deportation of
a witness."16
Applying these principles to the case, Justice O'Connor outlined a
number of practical considerations that must come into play. She cau-
tioned against mechanical application of the principles, stressing that
"the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamentalfairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged." 17 Additionally, "a court
need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant."1 8 Justice O'Connor
advised that if "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so,
that course should be followed." 19 In addressing claims of ineffective-
ness, appellate courts must determine whether counsel's conduct so un-
dermined the proper functioning of the trial process that the trial court
result cannot be relied upon as just.
Justice O'Connor also concluded that the same principles should ap-
ply to a capital sentencing procedure. "For purposes of describing coun-
sel's duties, [a] capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished
from an ordinary trial."20
In California, however, the state supreme court already had applied
the effective assistance of counsel standard in capital trials as set forth by
Pope in 1979.21 Thus, since Strickland, an effective assistance of counsel
standard is now applied in all criminal cases. As a practical proposition,
however, appellate courts undoubtedly will scrutinize competency claims
in capital cases more carefully. The stakes are simply higher. Further-
more, both the United States and California Supreme Courts have con-
cluded that retained counsel in criminal cases must be judged by the
16. Id. at 2068 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 2069 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 2069-70.
19. Id. at 2070.
20. Id. at 2064 (emphasis added).
21. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d
264, 288-89, 618 P.2d 149, 158-59, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 612-13 (1980), cert. denied, Jackson v.
California, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 163, 599 P.2d 587, 598,
158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 291-92 (1979).
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same standards applicable to appointed counsel.22
Finally, the United States Supreme Court in Strickland concluded
that the minor differences in the lower courts' precise formulations of the
actual ineffectiveness standard are insignificant. The different formula-
tions are mere variations of the "reasonable competence" standard.23
Taking Justice Stewart's approach to the law of obscenity,24 criminal
trial lawyers might best serve themselves and their clients by recognizing
that attorney "effectiveness," or lack thereof, has not been something
courts have been able to define articulately. Rather it's something "you
know when you see," and like beauty or ugliness, is oftentimes only in
the eye of the beholder.
Counsel undertaking the defense of a criminal case should bear in
mind, from the initial client interview, that the client's right to later chal-
lenge counsel's effectiveness greatly increases the odds that counsel may
be called to the witness stand at a later date to testify on matters as far
ranging as what happened to the fee or to why counsel did not interview
a certain witness. Recent California decisions indicate that tactical acts
or omissions which seriously prejudice a defendant's case may constitute
the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense, such as failure to
object to impeachment evidence,25 or failure to move to suppress
evidence.26
A recitation of cases which have found ineffective counsel would be
meaningless because they turn on their own unique facts and circum-
stances. A review of the cases does, however, tell us much of what we
already know. Effectiveness of counsel is the diligent use of available
skills and knowledge, including:
(1) Prompt and thorough fact investigation involving exploration
of factual avenues related to innocence, or, if the defendant is guilty, the
degree of penalty.
(2) Use of discovery procedure in the interests of the client.
(3) Knowledge and application of the law through motions and
during trial.
(4) Maintenance of a good attorney-client relationship.
(5) Use of scientific evidence and expert testimony in the interest
of the defense.
22. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1980); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142,
162, 599 P.2d 587, 598, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 291-92 (1979).
23. Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
24. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
25. People v. Zimmerman, 102 Cal. App. 3d 647, 658, 161 Cal. Rptr. 669, 674-76 (1980).
26. People v. Ellers, 108 Cal. App. 3d 943, 952, 166 Cal. Rptr. 888, 893 (1980).
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(6) The honest exercise of professional judgment based upon an
adequate foundation of fact and law.
In California we have found that the effective criminal practitioner's
file will serve as a defense if and when the practitioner's conduct is
brought into question. For those who are poor recordkeepers, it is clear
that the luxury of the naked file is gone forever. Since the trial lawyer
has an immunity for the honest exercise of professional judgment based
on an adequate foundation of fact and law, do not spare the pen. Keep
track of where you have been, where you believe you are going, and what
you have decided. Who can go back in a thousand-hour murder case and
explain satisfactorily two years later what happened along the way by
reference only to a cardboard box full of pleadings and transcripts?
Records will establish the attorney's effectiveness.
II. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BETWEEN CO-DEFENDANTS
A related but separate problem that has plagued defense counsel is
the multiple representation of criminal defendants. In the absence of a
knowing, intelligent waiver, both the United States and California
Supreme Courts have frequently found a denial of effective assistance of
counsel because of conflicts of interest between co-defendants.27
In People v. Mroczko2 s the California Supreme Court observed that
"'[in every case of multiple representation, there exists a likelihood, if
not a certainty, that the strategic maneuvers of the criminal defense at-
torney will adversely affect the interests of at least one defendant at some
point in the trial process.' "29 The court further commented that
"[w]hile the most obvious conflicts arise when defendants have inconsis-
tent defenses or... have been offered inconsistent plea bargains," almost
any difference in co-defendants' criminal records, credibility, appearance
or culpability "can trigger a conflict at trial."3 ° "'[I]nnumerable intangi-
ble factors'... may always lurk in the wings when there is a disparity of
involvement between codefendants."31
Because the potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple
defendants is so grave, the California Supreme Court's standard of re-
27. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978); People v. Chacon, 69 Cal.
2d 765, 773, 447 P.2d 106, 113, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 17 (1968).
28. 35 Cal. 3d 86, 672 P.2d 835, 197 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1983).
29. Id. at 103, 672 P.2d at 844, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 62 (quoting Geer, Representation of
Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the
Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REv. 119, 136 (1978)).
30. Id. at 103-04, 672 P.2d at 844-45, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
31. People v. Gallardo, 269 Cal. App. 2d 86, 90, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1969) (quoting
People v. Kerfoot, 184 Cal. App. 2d 622, 637, 7 Cal. Rptr. 674, 684 (1960)).
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view is extremely rigorous. Regardless of whether there was an objec-
tion, even a potential conflict may require reversal if the record supports
"'an informed speculation'" that an appellant's right to effective repre-
sentation was prejudicially affected.32 Proof of an "actual conflict" is not
required.33
While the right to conflict-free representation generally may be
waived,
the trial court must assure itself that (1) the defendant has dis-
cussed the potential drawbacks of joint representation with his
attorney, or if he wishes, outside counsel, (2) that he has been
made aware of the dangers and possible consequences of joint
representation in his case, (3) that he knows of his right to con-
flict-free representation, and (4) that he voluntarily wishes to
waive that right.34
There are special problems presented in determining whether there
has been a knowing waiver of a conflict of interest. The defense lawyer
who is torn between representing the best interest of each client is going
to have a difficult job explaining that dilemma to each client. The trial
court is at a different disadvantage because it cannot possibly know as
much about the case as defense counsel. Quite correctly, our courts are
now making it tough to represent more than one client.
In Mroczko, the California Supreme Court also adopted the follow-
ing judicially declared rule of criminal procedure:
[W]hen the court undertakes to appoint counsel, it must ini-
tially select separate and independent counsel for each defend-
ant "with an instruction that if counsel conclude, after fully
investigating the case and consulting with their clients, that the
interests of justice and of the clients will best be served by joint
representation, this conclusion with supporting reasons shall be
communicated to the court for such on-the-record disposition
as the court deems appropriate in the circumstances. '35
By shifting the burden to defense counsel, the court has provided much
greater certainty in this area, and for that we should be grateful.
32. People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 776 n.3, 447 P.2d 106, 113 n.3 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 17
n.3 (1968) (quoting Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
33. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 612-13, 639 P.2d 248, 251, 180 Cal. Rptr.
177, 180 (1982).
34. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d at 110, 672 P.2d at 850, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 115, 672 P.2d at 853, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (quoting Ford v. United States, 379
F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
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III. COMPETENCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL
It is not just the competency of trial counsel we are concerned
about. Unsuccessful appellants have increasingly challenged the effec-
tiveness of appellate counsel. The fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution requires that an accused indigent be afforded the
assistance of competent counsel on appeal.36 The California Supreme
Court, in In re Smith,37 set forth the duties which an appellant's ap-
pointed counsel must fulfill to meet his or her obligations as a competent
advocate. These include:
prepar[ing] a brief to assist the court in understanding the facts
and the legal issues in the case. The brief must set forth a state-
ment of the facts with citations to the transcript, discuss the
legal issues with citations of appropriate authority, and argue
all issues that are arguable.8
Thus, in Smith, our state supreme court held that the inexcusable failure
of defendant's appellate counsel to raise crucial assignments of error,
which originally might have resulted in a reversal, deprived the petitioner
of the effective assistance of appellate counsel.
There have been inconsistent interpretations as to the meaning of an
"arguable issue on appeal" which must be argued pursuant to the Smith
case. The court of appeal in People v. Scobie39 held that Smith developed
a new concept: the "arguable-but-unmeritorious" issue which had to be
argued as a requirement of due process on appeal." Some have sug-
gested this interpretation would reduce the process of appellate review to
some kind of a W.P.A. project for the continued employment of judges
and lawyers. Most courts have rejected this concept and held that
an arguable issue on appeal consists of two elements: First, the
issue must be one which, in counsel's professional opinion, is
meritorious. That is not to say that the contention must neces-
sarily achieve success. Rather, it must have a reasonable poten-
tial for success. Second, if successful, the issue must be such
that, if resolved favorably to the appellant, the result will either
be a reversal or a modification of the judgment.41
36. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Peo-
ple v. Barton, 21 Cal. 3d 513, 579 P.2d 1043, 146 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1978).
37. 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
38. Id. at 197, 474 P.2d at 971-72, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 4 (emphasis added).
39. 36 Cal. App. 3d 97, 111 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1973).
40. Id. at 99, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
41. People v. Johnson, 123 Cal. App. 3d 106, 109, 176 Cal. Rptr. 390, 391 (1981), cert.
denied, Johnson v. California, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
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Under this standard, the California courts have held that appellate coun-
sel were incompetent for neglecting to raise the issue of the trial court's
failure to state a reason for imposing consecutive terms,42 for neglecting
to cite a recent line of cases that would have resulted in reduction of the
charge4 3 and for failing to present an adequate record to enable the court
of appeal to reach the merits of defendant's search and seizure
contention.44
IV. NEw CASES
We have seen a couple of cases that have come down, on the state
and federal level, in just the last few weeks that bear directly on the right-
to-counsel issue. On December 27, 1984 the state supreme court re-
versed a conviction in a Merced County case, People v. Bigelow. 5 There,
the trial judge first allowed the defendant to discharge his lawyer and
represent himself, but then refused to appoint advisory counsel. The
court unanimously held that the failure of the trial court to appoint an
advisory counsel to in propria persona defendants is reversible error per
se.
46
And just recently, a strong majority of the United States Supreme
Court in Evitts v. Lucey47 held, for the first time, that criminal defend-
ants have the same right to effective counsel at the appellate stage as
during trial. The Court overturned a Kentucky man's conviction on
drug charges when the defendant's lawyer neglected to file a required
statement on appeal with the appellate brief, leading to dismissal of the
appeal.48 With Justices Burger and Rehnquist dissenting, Justice Bren-
nan wrote for the majority that the right to an effective lawyer is one of
the procedural protections a state must afford if it allows a defendant to
appeal his conviction.49 This is a first for the United States Supreme
Court. By so doing, it is only about ten years behind us in California.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of skill, reputation or past performance, an attorney
must realize that the de facto immunity of post-conviction inquiry into
42. In re Spears, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1203, 204 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1984).
43. In re Greenfield, 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1970).
44. People v. Barton, 21 Cal. 3d 513, 579 P.2d 1043, 146 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1978).
45. 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984), modified, 38 Cal. 3d 344a
(1985).
46. Id. at 744, 691 P.2d at 1001, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
47. 105 S. Ct. 830 (1985).
48. Id. at 832.
49. Id. at 834-36.
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his or her effectiveness is gone. The stakes are high in the criminal
courts. No one wants to be called to the witness stand under a charge of
ineffectiveness. The best way to prepare for claims of ineffectiveness is to
avoid them. Never handle a case where you are not prepared. When you
take a case, be effective and document your effectiveness. A good file
which documents not only your time, but the major tactical and strategic
tacks you took during the course of the trial, may save you a lot of grief.
If it sounds like the practice of defensive law-so be it. But if it leads to
greater care and discipline and better representation, then we can all take
some pride in giving greater substance to the sixth amendment.

